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Kolkata Restaurant Problem as a generalised El Farol Bar Problem
Bikas K. Chakrabarti∗
Theoretical Condensed Matter Physics Division and Centre for Applied Mathematics and Computational Science,
Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics 1/AF Bidhan Nagar, Kolkata 700064, India.
Generalisation of the El Farol bar problem to that of many bars here leads to the Kolkata restau-
rant problem, where the decision to go to any restaurant or not is much simpler (depending on the
previous experience of course, as in the El Farol bar problem). This generalised problem can be
exactly analysed in some limiting cases discussed here. The fluctuation in the restaurant service can
be shown to have precisely an inverse cubic behavior, as widely seen in the stock market fluctuations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The observed corrlated fluctuations in the stock mar-
kets, giving power law tails for large fluctuations (in
contrast to the traditionally assumed exponentially de-
caying Gaussian fluctuations of random walks), were
schematically incorporated in the El Farol Bar problem
of Arthur [1]. Here the decision to occupy the bar (buy
the stock) or to remaing at home (sell the stock) de-
pends on the previous experience of the “crowd” exceed-
ing the threshold (of pleasure or demand level) of the
bar (stock), and the strategies available. The resulting
Minority Game models [2] still fail to get the ubiquitus
inverse cubic law of stock fluctuations [3]. In the Fiber
Bundle models [4] of materials’ fracture, or in the equiv-
alent Traffic Jam models [5], the fibers or the roads fail
due to load, exceeding the (preassigned) random thresh-
old, and the extra load gets redistributed in the sur-
viving fibers or roads; thereby inducing the corelations
in the fluctuations or “avalanche” sizes. The avalanche
distribution has a clear inverse cubic power law tail in
the “equal load sharing” or “democratic” fiber bundle
model [6, 7].
In the El Farol Bar problem [1], the Santa Fe people
decide whether to go to the bar this evening, based on
his/her experince last evening(s). The bar can roughly
accommodate half the poulation of the (100-member
strong) Institute and the people coming to the bar still
enjoy the music and the food. If the crowd level goes
beyond this level, people do not enjoy and each of those
who came to the bar thinks that they would have done
better if they stayed back at home! Clearly, people do
not randomly choose to come to the bar or stay at home
(as assumed in a random walk model); they exploit their
past experience and their respective strategy (to decide
on the basis of the past experience). Of course the peo-
ple here are assumed to have all the same informations
at any time (and their respective personal experiences)
available to decide for themselves independently and par-
allely; they do not organise among themselves and go to
the bar! Had the choice been completely random, the
occupation fluctuation of the bar would be Gaussian.
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Because of the processes involved in deciding to go or
not, depending on the respective experience, the occupa-
tion fluctuation statistics changes. The “minority” peo-
ple win such games (all the people “lose” their money if
the bar gets “crowded”, or more than the threshold, say,
50 here); the bar represents either the “buy” or “sell”
room and the (single) stock fluctuations are expected to
be represented well by the model. The memory size and
the bag of tricks for each agent in the Minority Game
model made this process and the resulting analysis very
precise [2]. Still, as we mentioned earlier, it cannot ex-
plain the origin of the ubiquitous inverse cubic law of
fluctuations (see e.g. [3]).
We extend here this simple bar problem to many bars
(or from single stock to many), and define the Kolkata
Restaurant problem. The number of restaurants in
Kolkata, unlike in Santa Fe, are huge. Their (pleasure
level) thresholds are also widely distributed. The number
of people, who choose among these restaurants, are also
huge! Additionally, we assume that the decision making
part here in the Kolkata Restaurant problem to be ex-
tremely simple (compared to the El Farol bar problem):
if there had been any “bad experience” (say, crowd going
beyond threshold level) in any restaurant any evening,
all those who came there that evening avoid that one
for a suitably chosen long time period (T ) and starting
next evening redistribute this extra crowd or load equally
among the rest of the restaurants in Kolkata (equal or
democratic crowd sharing). This restaurant or the stock
fails (for the next T evenings). As mentioned before,
this failure will naturally increase the crowd level in all
the other restaurants, thereby inducing the possibility of
further failure of the restaurants in service (or service
stocks). If T is finite but large, the system of restaurants
in Kolkata would actually organise itself into a “critical”
state with a robust and precise inverse cubic power law
of (occupation or in-service number) fluctuation. This
we will show here analytically.
II. MODEL
Let n represent the number of restaurants in Kolkata.
They are certainly not identical in their size and com-
fort threshold levels. let p1, p2, ..., pn denote respectively
the crowd threshold levels of these n restaurants. If,
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FIG. 1: El Farol bar problem: To go (buy) or not to go (sell)
to a single bar (stock). Each of the N people have a choice
to stay in their respective homes (collectively represented by
a single ‘Home’ here) or go to the bar each evening. The bar
has a pleasure threshold N/2 (p = 1/2) beyond which people
get disappointed (lose the game) and the ‘minority’ deciding
to stay at home that evening win. In the reverse case, the bar
people become minority and each of them win.
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FIG. 2: Kolkata Restaurant problem: Many choice (stock)
problem. N people in the city, each has the same choice
to go to any of the restaurants (stocks) and therefore, each
retaurant gets p = N/n fraction of the crowd to start with. If
p > pi on any evening, then the p fraction of the people going
to that ith restaurant gets dissatisfied, and the ith restaurant
(stock) falls out of choice for the next T evenings. p then
increases to N/(n− 1) and that may lead to a further failure
of the jth restaurant (if pj < N/(n− 1)) and so on.
in any evening, the crowd level p in the ith restaurant
exceeds pi, then all the p number (fraction, when nor-
malised) of persons coming to the ith restaurant that
evening decide not to come to that restaurant for the
next T evenings, and the ith restaurant goes out of ser-
vice for the next T evenings (because others got satis-
faction from the restaurants they went last evening, and
therefore do not change their choice). If N is the total
number (assumed to be large and fixed) of people regu-
larly going to various restaurants in Kolkata, and if we
assume that people choose completely randomly among
all the restaurants in service (democratic or equal load
sharing hypothesis and “knowledge” of the “in-service”
restaurants available to everybody), the “avalanches” dy-
namics of these restaurants to fall out of service, can
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FIG. 3: Density ρ(pi) of the crowd handling capacities pi of
the restaurants. It is assumed here to be uniform upto a
threshold value (normalised to unity). At any evening t, if
the crowd level is pt, restaurants having pi ≤ pt all fail and
the fraction 1− pt of restaurants remain in service after that
evening.
be analytically investigated if T → ∞ and the thresh-
old crowd level distribution ρ(pi) for the restaurants are
known (see Figs. 1 and 2).
III. AVALANCHE DYNAMICS: INFINITE T
This avalanche dynamics can be represented by re-
cursion relations in discrete time steps. Let us define
Ut(p) to be the fraction of in-service restaurants in the
city that survive after (discrete) time step t (evenings),
counted from the time t = 0 when the load or crowd (at
the level p = N/n) is put in the system (time step in-
dicates the number of crowd redistributions). As such,
Ut(p = 0) = 1 for all t and Ut(p) = 1 for t = 0 for any p;
Ut(p) = U
∗(p) 6= 0 for t → ∞ if p < pc, and Ut(p) = 0
for t→∞ if p > pc.
If p is measured in the unit of the crowd threshold
of the biggest restaurant in Kolkata, or in other words,
if p is normalised to unity and ρ(pi) is assumed to be
uniformly distributed as shown in Fig. 3 (and T →∞ as
mentioned), then Ut(p) follows a simple recursion relation
(cf. [4, 5])
Ut+1 = 1− pt; pt =
N
Utn
or, Ut+1 = 1−
p
Ut
. (1)
In equilibrium Ut+1 = Ut = U
∗ and thus (1) is quadratic
in U∗ :
U∗
2
− U∗ + p = 0.
3The solution is
U∗(i) =
1
2
± (pc − p)
1/2; pc =
1
4
.
Here pc = Nc/n is the critical value of crowd level (per
restaurant) beyond which the system of (all the Kolkata)
restaurants fails completely. The quantity U∗(p) must be
real valued as it has a physical meaning: it is the fraction
of the restaurants that remains in service under a fixed
crowd or load p when the load per restaurant lies in the
range 0 ≤ p ≤ pc. Clearly, U
∗(0) = 1. The solution with
(+) sign is therefore the only physical one. Hence, the
physical solution can be written as
U∗(p) = U∗(pc) + (pc − p)
1/2; U∗(pc) =
1
2
and pc =
1
4
.
(2)
For p > pc we can not get a real-valued fixed point as the
dynamics never stops until Ut = 0 when the network of
restaurants get completely out of business!
A. Critical Behavior
1. At p < pc
It may be noted that the quantity U∗(p)− U∗(pc) be-
haves like an order parameter that determines a tran-
sition from a state of partial failure of the system (at
p ≤ pc) to a state of total failure (at p > pc) :
O ≡ U∗(p)− U∗(pc) = (pc − p)
β ; β =
1
2
. (3)
To study the dynamics away from criticality (p → pc
from below), we replace the recursion relation (1) by a
differential equation
−
dU
dt
=
U2 − U + p
U
.
Close to the fixed point we write Ut(p) = U
∗(p) + ǫ
(where ǫ→ 0). This gives
ǫ = Ut(p)− U
∗(p) ≈ exp(−t/τ), (4)
where τ = 1
2
[
1
2
(pc − p)
−1/2 + 1
]
. Thus, near the critical
point (for jamming transition) we can write
τ ∝ (pc − p)
−α; α =
1
2
. (5)
Therefore the relaxation time diverges following a power-
law as p→ pc from below.
One can also consider the breakdown susceptibility χ,
defined as the change of U∗(p) due to an infinitesimal
increment of the traffic stress p
χ =
∣
∣
∣
∣
dU∗(p)
dp
∣
∣
∣
∣ =
1
2
(pc − p)
−γ ; γ =
1
2
. (6)
Hence the susceptibility diverges as the average crowd
level p approaches the critical value pc =
1
4
.
2. At p = pc
At the critical point (p = pc), we observe a different
dynamic critical behavior in the relaxation of the fail-
ure process. From the recursion relation (1), it can be
shown that decay of the fraction Ut(pc) of restaurants
that remain in service at time t follows a simple power-
law decay:
Ut =
1
2
(1 +
1
t+ 1
), (7)
starting from U0 = 1. For large t (t → ∞), this reduces
to Ut − 1/2 ∝ t
−δ; δ = 1; a power law, and is a robust
characterization of the critical state.
B. Universality Class of the Model
The universality class of the model can be checked [4]
taking two other types of restaurant capacity distribu-
tions ρ(p): (I) linearly increasing density distribution
and (II) linearly decreasing density distribution of the
crowd fraction thresholds p within the limit 0 and 1. One
can show that while pc changes with different strength
distributions (pc =
√
4/27 for case (I) and pc = 4/27
for case (II), the critical behavior remains unchanged:
α = 1/2 = β = γ, δ = 1 for all these equal crowd or load
sharing models.
C. Fluctuation or Avalanche Statistics
For p < pc, the avalance size m can be defined as
the fraction of restaurants falling out of service for an
infinitesimal increase in the global crowd level (c.f. [6])
m =
dM
dp
; M = 1− U∗(p). (8)
With U∗(p) taken from (2), we get
pc − p ∼ m
−2.
If we now denote the avalanche size distribution by P (m),
then P (m)∆m measures ∆p along the m versus p curve
in (8). In other words [6, 7]
P (m) =
dp
dm
∼ m−η, η = 3. (9)
IV. AVALANCHE DYNAMICS: FINITE T
The above results are for T →∞, i.e, when any restau-
rant fails to satisfy its customers, it falls out of business,
and customers never come back to it. This would also be
valid if T is greater than the relaxation time τ defined in
(4). However, if such a restaurant again comes back to
4service (people either forget or hope that it has got better
in service and start choosing it again) after T evenings,
then several scenerios can emerge.
If T is very small, the recursion relation (1) can be
written as
Ut+1 = 1−
p
1− Ut−T + Ut
. (10)
In fact, if T is large, Ut−T = 1 and (10) reduces to (1).
However, if T is very small, say of the order of unity, then
at the fixed point, Ut+1 = U
∗ = U∗t−T = Ut and one gets
U∗ = 1− p.
From (8) one gets
P (m) ∼ δ(m−m0) (11)
where m0 is determined by the initial conditions.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We generalise here the El Farol bar problem to that of
many bars. This leads us to the Kolkata restaurant prob-
lem, where the decision to go to any restaurant or not is
much simpler; it still depends on the previous experience
of course, as in the El Farol bar problem, but does not
explicitly depend on the memory size or the size of the
strategy pool. Rather, people getting disappointed with
any restaurant on any evening avoids that restaurant for
the next T evenings. This generalised problem can be ex-
actly analysed in some limiting cases discussed here. In
the T →∞ limit, the fluctuation in the restaurant service
can be shown to have precisely an inverse cubic behavior
(see eqn. (9)), as widely seen in the stock market fluc-
tuations. For very small values of T , the fluctuatuation
distribution become δ-function like (see eqn. (11)). For
large but finite T , the system of restaurants in Kolkata
will survive at a (self-organised) critical state [8].
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